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We consider a population of agents competing for finite resources using strategies based on two
channels of signals. The model is applicable to financial markets, ecosystems and computer networks.
We find that the dynamics of the system is determined by the correlation between the two channels.
In particular, occasional mismatches of the signals induce a series of transitions among numerous
attractors. Surprisingly, in contrast to the effects of noises on dynamical systems normally resulting
in a large number of attractors, the number of attractors due to the mismatched signals remains
finite. Both simulations and analyses show that this can be explained by the antipersistent nature of
the dynamics. Antipersistence refers to the response of the system to a given signal being opposite
to that of the signal’s previous occurrence, and is a consequence of the competition of the agents to
make minority decisions. Thus, it is essential for stabilizing the dynamical systems.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.70.Ln, 87.23.Ge, 64.60.Ht
Keywords: competing population, antipersistence, minority game, dynamical transitions, attractors
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting from the last decade, physicists have been try-
ing to cope with the issues traditionally approached by
economists using their own tools and methodologies [1].
This research has been dubbed ‘econophysics’. Since the
financial market can be considered as a complex system
with large population, techniques of statistical mechan-
ics are applicable. The Minority Game (MG) is a simple
statistical mechanical model for us to study complex eco-
nomical systems. The minority-winning nature of MG is
close to situations in daily life. For example, in finan-
cial markets, all buyers and sellers want to maximize
their wealth. Only the minority side gains the bene-
fits because of excess demand or supply of the whole
system. This often creates the antipersistent behavior,
which refers to agents rushing to the minority side as
adaptive attempts in the evolving environment, resulting
in opposite responses to the consecutive occurrence of a
given signal [3].
Decisions of agents in the market are often responses
to the information relevant to them. However, noisy in-
formation may cause confusion in their decision making.
Hence, we are interested in studying the effects of noisy
signals to the system and the underlying physics. In or-
der to model these features, a new MG model, “The Mi-
nority Game with Errors” with two channels of signals is
introduced in this paper.
II. THE MINORITY GAME WITH ERRORS
This model is based on the original Minority Game [2].
“The Minority Game with Errors” is a binary game that
N (N must be odd) agents have to make binary decisions
∗Electronic address: eyeshadow.lee@gmail.com, phkywong@ust.hk
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the signal for D = 2, with errors for
every τ time steps. Exo-1 is randomly generated. Exo-2 is
nearly identical to Exo-1.
(denoted by 0 or 1) independently at every time step and
the agents making the minority decision win. The deci-
sions of the agents are based on signals. In the original
version of MG, the signals are endogenous, which consist
of the winning bits of the most recent M steps. In an-
other version of the game, the signals are exogenous [4],
which are randomly selected from D signals at each step.
Studies had shown that the behavior of these two ver-
sions are very similar [4]. In this paper, we adopt the
exogenous version of MG.
Each agent holds s strategies which are binary func-
tions mapping theD signals to decision 0 or 1.They adopt
the most successful one among the s strategies in order
to have a higher chance to win. The success of a strategy
is measured by its cumulative payoff (or virtual point),
which changes by +1 for a minority decision and -1 for a
majority decision. In order to model the errors in signals,
we introduce s channels of external nearly identical sig-
nals, each feeding the corresponding strategy. For s = 2,
we call the signals Exo-1 and Exo-2. In detail, Exo-1 is
a randomly generated signal. Exo-2 is the same as Exo-
1 in most of the time steps, but differs occasionally, as
shown in Fig. 1. Thus, we can treat them as one channel
of signals with occasional errors.
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FIG. 2: Time series of attendance in a simulation with N =
511, D = 2, s = 2 and τ = 104.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We schedule the errors to occur once every τ steps,
where τ is a large number compared with the period of
dynamics so that agents can have enough time to adapt
to changes of the system caused by errors. Figure 2 shows
a simulated time series of attendance, which is defined as
the number of agents choosing 1 in a time step. We can
observe that attendance clusters only on several values
(around 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7) before the occurrence of the
first error at t = τ . Using the language of non-linear sci-
ence, there exists an attractor which contributes to the
dynamics of the system. After an error occurs, the atten-
dance clusters on another set of values (around 0.4 and
0.6). Hence, a new attractor is formed due to the errors
in the input signals. After each occurrence of errors, the
pattern of attendance alternates between the two attrac-
tor states of the system. Other intervals between errors,
as well as other samples, result in two further attractors.
Since the error generation mechanism is random, it is sur-
prising that errors result in regular patterns. In contrast,
many complex systems, when fed with occasional noisy
signals, move among numerous attractors, and therefore
cannot maintain their stability.
From the above results, this system appears to be re-
sistive to huge changes. Then, we may ask the following
questions in order to know more about its stability:
1. What is the number of attractors in this system?
2. If the number of attractors is finite, what is the
mechanism forbidding the occurrence of numerous
attractors?
Detailed analyses in the following sections are essential
to answering the above questions.
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FIG. 3: (a) Numerical results of the attractors in the phase
space. Parameters: N = 511, D = 2, s = 2. (b) Analytic
calculation in the phase space.
IV. PHASE SPACE ANALYSIS
In order to understand the dynamics of the system
easily, Aµ is defined as follows [5, 6].
Aµ(t) =
N
µ
1
(t)−Nµ
0
(t)
N
, (1)
where Nµ
1
(t), Nµ
0
(t) are, respectively, the number of
agents choosing 1 and 0 when the input signal is µ at
time t. For simplicity, we consider D = 2 so that µ = 0
or 1. If Aµ is positive, the minority side will be 0, and
vice versa. Thus, Aµ is a useful tool to analyze the dy-
namics inside the system when it responds to different
input signals µ. As there are only A0 and A1, using the
two-dimensional phase space is the most suitable way to
describe the dynamics [5].
From the simulation results in Fig. 3(a), the clustered
data points show that the system stays in different at-
tractors between the occurrence of error signals. Each
attractor has a polygonal pattern of its own size in the
phase space.
Since the dimension is not high (D = 2), the dynam-
ics of the system can be studied analytically. For each
strategy combination, the number of agents holding it
3is assumed to be the same if N is large compared with
the total number of strategy combinations. Therefore,
the attractor states can be calculated by considering cu-
mulative payoffs of all strategies. The values of these
attractor states in different stages are listed in Table I.
Sequence Colour Coordinates of attractors No. of states
(A0,A1)
1 Blue (0±, 0±) (0,±1/2), 9
(±1/2, 0), (±3/8, ±3/8)
2 Red (±1/4, ±1/4) 4
3 Green (0±, 0±), (0,±3/8), 9
(±3/8, 0), (±1/4, ±1/4)
4 Pink (±1/8, ±1/8) 4
TABLE I: Analytical results for different attractors
In Fig. 3(b), the colour lines are the analytical results
in Table I. Before the first error, the attractor of the
system is the blue one. When an error occurs, the at-
tractor transits to the red one with a smaller size. When
a further error appears, the system restores back to the
original blue attractor with a very high probability, and
transits to the green one with a low probability. Simi-
larly, transitions to further attractors may continue but
with a lower and lower probability. The transitions of the
attractors follow by the sequence as shown in Table I.
The pink attractor, the smallest among all, represents
the final stage of attractor transitions. An occurrence of
error in the pink attractor cannot cause it to transit fur-
ther into another attractor. It must restore back to the
previous attractor (green) when one more error occurs.
V. PAYOFF SPACE ANALYSIS
In order to study the mechanism of this stoppage of
further attractor transitions, one should study the payoff
space, whose dimensions are kµ(t), defined as the number
of wins minus losses of decision 1 up to time t when the
game responded to signal µ. Since a location in the pay-
off space records the winning history of decision 1, the
cumulative payoffs of all strategies can be calculated [5].
For example, the cumulative payoff Ωa(t) of strategy a
up to time t can be computed as follow,
Ωa(t) =
∑
µ
kµ(t)(2σ
µ
a
− 1), (2)
where σµ
a
is the binary decision (0 or 1) of strategy a for
signal µ. Thus, the dynamics of the system can be totally
determined after knowing the trajectories in the payoff
space.
Attractor transitions in the payoff space shown in
Figs. 4(a)-(d) are the same as those in the phase space
using identical colours and sequences. In Fig. 4(a), the
nine points represent the nine states of the blue attrac-
tor. When an error occurs in the blue attractor, each
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FIG. 4: (a) The first attractor (blue), (b) The second at-
tractor (red), (c) The third attractor (green), (d) The final
attractor (pink).
state splits into two, due to different signals in Exo-1
and Exo-2. In order to identify the two groups of at-
tractor states in Fig. 4, we use N and  to represent the
states responding to Exo-1 and Exo-2 respectively. Dot-
ted lines are drawn to show the dynamics and linkages of
the two separated states. After splitting, the nine states
of the blue attractor combine to form the four pairs of
states of the red attractor in Fig. 4(b), the states in each
pair being separated by a displacement of 1 in both the
horizontal and vertical directions. The states in each pair
move in the same direction simultaneously in the payoff
space while the signals in Exo-1 and Exo-2 are identical.
Similarly, when an error occurs in the red attractor, the
four pairs of states may split and combine to form the
nine pairs of attractor states of the green attractor in
Fig. 4(c), and the displacements in these new pairs are
2 in both directions. The transition from the green to
pink attractor in Fig. 4(d) can be described similarly. In
summary, the attractors are different in the vertical and
horizontal displacements separating the two groups of at-
tractor states. From Fig. 4(b)-(d), the vertical and hor-
izontal separations between the two groups of attractor
states are constant for each attractor. Moreover, the sep-
arations change by 1 when an attractor transition takes
place due to the occurrence of an error. Thus, the hor-
izontal and vertical separations in the blue, red, green
and pink attractors are 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
The mechanism of attractor transition is explained in
Fig. 5. Suppose the attractor states responding to Exo-
1 and Exo-2 lie on the k1 and k0 axes respectively, and
the corresponding input signals are 0 (for Exo-1) and
1 (for Exo-2). In this case, k0 = 0 among the agents
responding to Exo-1. From Eq. (2), all strategies have
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FIG. 5: Mechanism of attractor transition. If the minority
side is 0, both attractor states decrease by 1 and transit to
another attractor as shown in the right hand side.
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FIG. 6: The alternation of k1 between (2,-1) and (1,-2) of a
pair of states in the pink attractor. (Left) For signal 1, the 
group has more agents favoring decision 0 since k1 = −1, but
the N group has even move agents forming 1 since k1 = 2 >
| − 1|. The minority side is 0. (Right) The minority side is 1.
the same cumulative payoff. Since the strategies are ran-
domly picked, on average of half of the agents in group
choose 0 and the remaining half choose 1 to the lower or-
der. A similar argument applies to the agents responding
to Exo-2. The winning decision will then be determined
by the sample-dependent fluctuations of the strategies to
the next order. The minority side is 0 with probability
1/2 so that the locations of the groups N and  in Fig. 5
both decrease by 1 along the k0 and k1 axes respectively.
Hence, the displacements between these two groups in-
crease by 1, transforming the attractor from red to green.
From the above results, we can deduce that the at-
tractor transitions do not have infinite stages. The fi-
nal stage is the pink attractor as shown in Fig. 4(d).
The vertical and horizontal separations between a pair
of states in this attractor are 3. Both the k0 and k1 co-
ordinates of the pair of states alternate between (2, -1)
and (1, -2) in the pink attractor, as shown in Fig. 6 and
as verified analytically. The physical explanation for this
stoppage of further attractor transitions is contributed
by the intrinsic antipersistent nature of Minority Game.
Antipersistence is the response of the system to a given
signal being opposite to that of the signal’s previous oc-
currence [7]. This nature resists consecutive winnings or
losings for the same signal, causing the coordinates of the
pink attractor states to oscillate between 2 and 1, or -1
and -2, but never reach 0 where transitions to further at-
tractors are possible. Therefore, it limits the number of
attractors of this complex system under noisy signals to
4. Thus, antipersistence strengthens the stability of the
whole system and avoid large fluctuations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new variation of
Minority Game, “Minority Game with Errors”. The new
feature is the usage of two channels of signals to model
the effects of errors occurred in the input signals. We
found that the noisy signals induce transitions between
different attractors, but the number of accessible attrac-
tors is limited by antipersistent effects. Hence, antiper-
sistence is able to stabilize dynamical systems, making
them robust against noise.
Antipersistence is a generic feature which can be ex-
tended beyond a single model. In financial markets, a
lot of irrelevant information or news may bother deci-
sions of an individual. Nevertheless, the whole system
will not be affected by noisy signals easily. Similar to the
phenomena that we studied in this model, antipersistent
nature stabilizes the system by restricting the number of
stages in attractor transition. Therefore, the systems are
prevented from breaking down.
It would be interesting to explore further the mani-
festation of antipersistence in the extensions of present
model. For example, we may consider the effects of more
complicated errors using more channels and strategies,
the reception of noisy channels with different probabili-
ties for different agents, and the stabilization effects of
diversity in the initial references.
In summary, the Minority Game with multiple chan-
nels is a realistic model for physicists to explore the im-
portance of information or errors to complex systems.
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